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China pe rspect i ves
Real optimism lies in saying that the next 25,000 years will be very
difficult. – Romain Gary
Ayear after the Copenhagen Summit, the Cancun Conference (29November-11 December 2010) showed that, despite someprogress, nothing decisive will happen in facing up to climate
change without the engagement of the United States as well as the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. In the climate arena, as in so many others, the G2
has in fact emerged as a global axis, and countless difficulties that punc-
tuated attempts to draw up an indispensable “post-Kyoto” regime from
Bali (December 2007) to Tianjin (October 2010) can be seen as so many
signs of the general reconfiguration of the post-Cold War international sys-
tem – a reconfiguration taking neither the form of unipolarity centred on
American hyperpower (dreaded by some) nor of multipolarity (hoped for
by others), but rather of Washington-Beijing bipolarity. Of course, the Eu-
ropean Union (27-strong) accounts for a quarter of the world’s GDP and
must play a major role in drawing up a more equitable international order.
Unfortunately, divergences among its members on climate, currency, de-
fence, and the trans-Atlantic link, among others, keep it from converting
its unique institutional structure into political will. As Chris Patten wrote in
2010, “Europe is not and will not become a superpower or superstate. Un-
like the US we do not matter everywhere.” (1)
China, on the other hand, has been making its voice heard and extending
its influence widely on the international scene. The Middle Kingdom is now
an indispensable supplier of funds to the United States and to many Third
World countries, as well as to Greece and even Portugal. It is no longer the
workshop of the world, as it had been dubbed only recently. It has emerged
as a development model admired by many governments in the global
south. This ascent is illustrated by the fact that some people are now talk-
ing about an emerging “Beijing Consensus” to supplant the now defunct
“Washington Consensus.”
This rearrangement of the global chessboard is not without implications
for the “climate question,” which is becoming more serious even as its res-
olution is getting complicated. This double effect appears clearly as much
in the analysis of historic and prospective links between the economic evo-
lution of the G2 members and their greenhouse gas emissions as in the ex-
amination of possible solutions leading to a new climate regime.
G2 and CO2
In July 2009, during the first US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
in Washington, President Barack Obama declared, “The relationship be-
tween the United States and China will shape the twenty-first century.” Of
course, all political talk has a performative focus. All the same, the least
that can be said about this quote is that it is confirmed by all available in-
dicators, be they measures of economic might or (present and future) re-
sponsibility for climate change.
The world’s top two economies (in PPP terms)
Calculated in “purchasing power parities” (PPP) terms, (2) the US and Chi-
nese gross domestic products are the world’s two highest. Measured
against current exchange rates, China inevitably recedes to third place be-
hind Japan, but it is nevertheless ahead of Germany, France, and Britain. (3)
This position caps three decades of sustained, exceptional economic
growth following the Deng Xiaoping-initiated shift towards capitalism in
1978, further consolidated through stepped-up liberalisation (and open-
ing) of the economy after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre (4) (symbolised by
Deng’s “southern tour” of 1992). Thus, between 1980 and 2008, that is, in
a little over a quarter of a century, the Chinese GDP (PRC and Hong Kong
in current exchange rates) leapt from $243.1 billion (2000) to $2,843.9 bil-
lion, a nearly 12-fold rise, or a 9.2 percent growth rate. Meanwhile (using
the same calculations), the GDP of the United States rose from $5,142.1
billion to $11,742.3 billion, that is 2.3 times, with a growth rate just under
3 percent (Table 1). In purchasing power parity terms, China’s “recovery” is
even more impressive (Table 2). Thus, by any calculation, the G2 today rep-
resents more than a third of global GDP.
An essential fact that is part of these changes: the US and Chinese
economies have developed a veritable symbiosis, an amazing phenomenon
given that their political systems are profoundly at loggerheads in terms of
basic values: one a liberal democracy, the other a dictatorship (officially) pro-
fessing communism. But unlike US-Soviet relations, which pitted two sys-
tems with all-round divergences on both the political and economic planes,
Sino-US ties interweave rivalry (ideological, strategic…) with interdepend-
ence (economic). During the Cold War, issues such as the undervaluing of the
rouble against the dollar or sovereign US debt held by the Soviets or even
the volume of US imports from the Soviet Union were simply never raised.
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Who would say the same about the Chinese economy now? (5) Many experts
say the yuan is undervalued by 20 percent to 40 percent against the dollar,
resulting in US importing four times more to China than it exports. At the
same time, China has been making bulk purchases of US treasury bonds, thus
financing the American debt and deficit. The US treasury is replenished up to
a billion dollars a day, with China having accumulated about $800 billion in
American bonds. Beijing and Tokyo have thus become Washington’s top
creditors, and China the state with the least interest in seeing the dollar col-
lapse. Actually, China’s foreign exchange reserves amount to $2,500 billion,
about two-thirds of it (still) in US dollars. The Soviet Union’s bankruptcy,
wished (and accelerated, even provoked?) (6) by the United States, did not
have the slightest repercussion on the latter, which by the 1990s had be-
come a hyperpower. But the collapse of either of the two economies – Chi-
nese or US – will have incalculable consequences for the other. The term
“Chimerica,” (7) coined in 2007, seeks to capture this enmeshing – or fusion,
as some would have it (8) – of the world’s top two economies.
In a sign of how times have changed, the US President preferred to at-
tend the ASEAN Summit in November 2009 rather than to visit Germany
for the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In January 2009,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was an adviser to Barack Obama before the 2008
presidential campaign, wrote an article in the Financial Times entitled “The
Group of Two that Could Change the World.” (9) He noted that Sino-US ties
must be a comprehensive partnership, an “informal  G2.” He also noted
that China was a “revisionist power” seeking to tilt the balance of forces in
its favour, and that consequently, cooperation between the two giants
won’t be without rivalries. A few weeks later, on 6 March 2009, Robert
Zoellick and Justin Yifu Lin – president and chief economist, respectively, of
the World Bank – wrote in the Washington Post that a solution to the crisis
required cooperation between China and the United States and that the
two had to become “the engine for the Group of 20.” (10)
To consider just one economic domain, Beijing in 2005 declared it
wanted to quadruple its GDP by 2020. Although the crisis that erupted in
2008 led to worries, given that Chinese exports were badly hurt by the
slow-down in Western economies, the two-year recovery plan the govern-
ment announced in November 2008 seems to have borne fruit: 9.1 percent
growth in 2009, as much as 10.5 percent in 2010, and 9.6 percent pro-
jected for 2011. And these figures for the Middle Kingdom’s growth per-
spectives will not, of course, disprove Brzezinski. Despite the inherent
weakness of any long-term forecast, a number of broad-brush features are
discernible. Claude Meyer has said, for example, that “barring major polit-
ical or social crisis, China could become the world’s top economy by
2030.” (11)
A distinct feature of the current situation, and of the foreseeable future,
is that the world economy will be dominated in the decades to come by
two countries with different stages of development. Despite its spectac-
ular rise, China remains an emerging economy, as seen from the compar-
ison of the US and Chinese GDPs. This gap is undeniable. Even if calculated
in PPP (Table 3), which tends to reflect real differences in standards of liv-
ing better than calculations based on current exchange rates, an American
would still be eight times richer than a Chinese resident. Such disparity, as
it will be seen, compounds the difficulty of resolving the climate problem.
The G2 is not only the club of the two global economic leaders; it is also
one of the planet’s two top emitters of greenhouse gases. 
The world’s two biggest polluters
These figures are also undeniable. In 2008, the United States released
into the atmosphere 5.6 billion tonnes (gigatonnes or Gt) of CO2 and China
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Country 1980 2008 2008/1980 (%) Annual growth rate (%)
United States 5,142.1 11,742.3 2.3 2.9
China (including Hong Kong) 243.1 2,843.9 11.7 9.2
G2 5,385.2 14,586.2 2.7
World 18,137.9 40,481.5 2.2 2.9
G2/world (%) 29.7 36.0
Table 1 – G2 GDP (Using current exchange rates – billion 2000 US dollars)
Source: Based on International Energy Agency data. CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, Highlights. 2010 Edition. (Text available on the Internet).
Country 1980 2008 2008/1980 (%) Annual growth rate (%)
United States 5,142,1 11,742.3 2.3 2.9
China (including Hong Kong) 821.7 11,053.7 13.5 9.7
G2 5,963.8 22,796.0 3.8
World 25,098.3 63,865.8 2.54 3.4
G2/world (%) 23.7 35.7
Table 2 – G2 GDP (Using purchasing power parities – billion 2000 US dollars)
Source: Based on International Energy Agency data, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, Highlights. 2010 Edition. (Text available on the Internet).
a little more than 6.5 Gt. With a total volume of emissions somewhat
more than 29 Gt, it works out to more than 41 percent (19.0 percent for
the United States and 22.3 percent for China) (12) (Table 4). To better un-
derstand the nature of some challenges (environmental and political) in-
ternal and external of the G2, it would be useful to place the snapshot data
in a dual perspective – historical and prospective.
Table 4 gives a good picture of the changes in China: from a very low
level in the 1970s and gradually, as its economy developed, catching up
and overtaking total US emissions in 2007.
Nevertheless, there remains a considerable imbalance in the Chinese and
US per capita emissions. This imbalance (1 American “equals” 3.7 Chinese)
translates – approximating for clarity – into China, with a fifth of the
world’s population, accounting for a fifth of global CO2 emissions, and the
United States, with less than 5 percent of the world population, emitting
a fifth of the CO2 each year. The imbalance is actually even greater, as the
3.7 figure fails to account for carbon “exports” and “imports” engendered
by international trade. In 2004, trade was responsible for 23 percent of
global emissions of CO2, about 6.2 Gt. China exported 1,147 million tonnes
(Mt) of CO2, while the United States imported 699 Mt. Given these figures,
China is the world’s top CO2 exporter and the United States the top im-
porter. (13) Keeping in mind their respective population sizes, (14) these fig-
ures show that each American “imports” 2.36 tonnes of CO2 (699/296)
while each Chinese “exports” 0.87 tonne (1,147/1,310.5). The per capita
difference is thus no longer 19.5 to 3.9 but 21.86 (19.5 + 2.36) to 3.03 (3.9
– 0.87): Thus not a five-fold difference but 7.2-fold (21.86/3.03). 
Apart from this, the two countries’ responsibility for current global warm-
ing is likewise unequal. The United States was responsible for 30 percent of
total CO2 emissions between 1900 and 2004, while China accounted for just
9 percent during that period. (15) However, whereas each country’s historical
responsibility should of course be considered – and Beijing never misses an
opportunity to say so – resolving the “climate question” cannot, out of con-
cern for equality, be conditioned on Chinese per capita emissions reaching
the US level (which is, it may be noted, double Japan’s and triple France’s).
That said, one of the major difficulties “post-Kyoto” lies in the expected
growth in CO2 emissions over coming decades in developing and emerging
(BRIC) countries, whose right to develop cannot be questioned.
No need to belabour this point. Between 1990 and 2008, global emis-
sions of CO2 rose from 20,964.8 Gt to 29,381.4 Gt, an increase of 40.1 per-
cent. But this average hides highly contrasting nation- and region-wide
changes. Countries that ratified the Kyoto protocol and adopted con-
straints reduced their emissions by 9.2 percent between 1990 and 2008. It
should be added, however, that this figure is largely due to cuts made by
economies in transition (the Annex I EITs) (16) (see Box). Emissions by An-
nexe II countries (Western Europe and North America, for example) actu-
ally rose by 12 percent. In 2008, for the first time, the emissions of “non-
Annex I” (17) countries overtook those of Annex I. Between 2007 and 2008,
non-Annex I countries’ emissions rose by nearly 6 percent, while those of
Annex 1 fell by 2 percent.
As the International Energy Agency (IEA) noted, in 2008, developing
countries’ aggregate emissions were greater than those of developed
countries, (18) and everything indicates this trend will continue. The IEA es-
timates that CO2 emissions attributable to energy use, which totalled 28.8
Gt in 2007, would rise to 34.5 Gt in 2020 and 40.2 Gt in 2030 – that is, an
annual growth of 1.5 percent. (19) The IEA notes that non-OECD members
account for the expected increase (11.4 Gt), and that three-fourths of it
will come from China.
Annexes
The terms used in the “Annexes” might seem rather confusing.
Many articles refer to Annexes I and II and others to Annex B.
Actually, the denominations refer to different legal texts.
Annexes I and II and “non-I” stem from the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change - UNFCCC of 1992.
Annex I consists of industrialised members of the OECD in 1992
plus economies in transition (Annex I EIT for Economies in Transi-
tion), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and a num-
ber of Central and Eastern European states. The United States is in
Annex I.
Annex II includes the OECD members of Annex I but not those of
Annex I EIT.
The non-Annex I states are developing economies. China is a “non-
Annex I” country.
Annex B relates to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which followed the
1992 Framework Convention. Annex B includes Annex I countries
that committed to measured cuts in greenhouse gas emissions.
The United States figures in Annex B, but having repudiated the
Kyoto protocol, it is exempt from reduction commitments.
In practice, many people use Annex I and Annex B synonymously. 
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12. For comparison, Europe’s 27 members represented 3.85Gt (0.37 for France and 0.80 for Germany),
Japan 1.15Gt, and India 1.43Gt. 
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op. cit., p. 7.
19. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009. Document available on the IEA website.
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Country Actual exchange rates (US$) In purchasing power parity
United States 46,350 100
China 3,270 12.9
US/China 14.17 7.7
Table 3 – 2008 GDP per capita for the G2 
Source: The Economist, Pocket World in Figures. 2011 Edition, London, Profile Books, 2010. 
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1971 1980 1990 2000 2006 2008
United States
Total 
emissions 
4,291.3
(30.4 %)
4,661.6
(25.8 %)
4,863.3
(23.2 %)
5,693.0
(24.2 %)
5,698.3
(20.3 %)
5,595.9
(19.9 %)
Population
207.7
(5.5 %)
227.7
(5.1 %)
250,2
(4.7 %)
282.4
(4.6 %)
299.2
(4.6 %)
304.5
(4.5 %)
Emissions 
per capita 
20.7 20.5 19.4 20.1 19.0 18.4
China
Total 
emissions 
809.6
(5.7 %)
1,420.0
(7.9 %)
2,244.0
(10.7 %)
3,077.6
(13.1 %)
5,645.2
(20.1 %)
6,550.5
(22.3 %)
Population 
845.2
(22.5 %)
986.3
(22.2 %)
1,140.9
(21.7 %)
1,269.3
(20.9 %)
1,318.7
(20.2 %)
1,332.6
(19.9 %)
Emissions 
per capita 
0.9 1.4 2.0 2.4 4.3 4.9
23 14.6 9.7 8.4 4.4 3.7
3,758.4 4,435.4 5,259.2 6,072.7 6,535.2 6,687.9
Emissions World total 14,095.0 18,054.8 20,980.5 23,497.3 28,028.0 29,381.4
Total G2 5,100.9 6,081.6 7,107.3 8,770.6 11,343.5 12,146.4
Total G2
world
36.2 % 33.7 % 33.9 % 37.3 % 40.5 % 41.3 %
Table 4 – US and Chinese CO2 emissions (total* and per capita**) 1971-2008 
US/Chinese emissions per capita
World population
Note: Total emissions are given in millions of tonnes of CO2, emissions per capita in tonnes of CO2, and the population in millions. Figures in brackets show the share of the world total.
Source: Based on International Energy Agency data, CO2 Emissions From Fuel Combustion, Highlights. 2010 Edition. (Text available on the Internet).
The G2 climate
Obviously, drawing up a new “climate  regime” has become imperative
even as the climate within the G2 is less than favourable. Chris Patten per-
fectly summed up the challenge of the coming years: “The [Kyoto] Protocol
distinguishes between developed countries, which have largely created
today’s problems, and developing countries, which need assistance to
avoid creating tomorrow’s.” (20) It is thus high time the next stage was
reached. It is all clear on paper: In order to prevent the earth’s temperature
from rising more than 2°C above the pre-industrial level, annual emissions
have to stay below 14.5 GtCO2. But we are already producing double that!
Before attempting some reflections on what the future holds, it would be
useful to take a (quick) stock of the Copenhagen and Cancun summits.
Copenhagen to Cancun… awaiting Durban 
When the projectors were finally switched off at the Copenhagen Summit
(Conference of Parties 15 or COP 15) (21) on 19 December 2009, the domi-
nant opinion was, in the words of Herman Van Rompuy, that it was an “in-
credible disaster.” More than a year later, it seems clear – as was foreseen (22)
– that neither the United States nor China wanted a limiting multilateral
accord. Revelations by WikiLeaks show that contrary to the wishes of Paris,
Berlin, and London, there was no desire in Washington to exercise leadership
on the climate issue. As for China’s obstruction strategy, it was quickly re-
vealed by a number of witnesses. However – and this no doubt was part of
Beijing’s calculations – most observers laid the blame squarely on the US.
While the Copenhagen summit was not, to say the least, an advance in
terms of international coordination on climate issues, it nevertheless had
some interesting results. This ultra-minority view in early 2010 received the
backing of Christian de Perthuis and Annaic Delbosc. They conceded in an
article that the Copenhagen text was not legally binding, unlike the Kyoto
Protocol, but added that it nonetheless marked a turning point for two rea-
sons. First, the Copenhagen commitments cover much more ground than
the Kyoto Protocol. By including US emissions as well as those of emerging
countries, the commitments target not 25 percent but rather 75 percent of
global emissions of greenhouse gases. Second, the Annex I countries agreed
to reduce their 2020 emissions by 12 percent of their 1990 level.
The major advance of the Copenhagen accords [they said] lay in
greatly expanding the amount of greenhouse gases covered by the
limits agreed. Of course, the scope of the agreements fall short of
the levels IPCC recommended for Annex I countries. For developing
countries, the commitments leave space for a rise in emissions that
would be quite conducive to the pursuit of rapid growth by the
major emerging countries. (23)
20. Chris Patten, What Next? Surviving the Twenty-first Century, London, Penguin Books, 2009, p. 369.
21. Each year, countries that have ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(1992) hold a “Conference of the Parties” (COP). The first was held in Berlin in 1995, the second in
Geneva in 1996… the 15th at Copenhagen in 2009, and the 16th at Cancun in 2010. The 17th will
take place in Durban, South Africa.
22. See Jean-Paul Maréchal, “Moins 40% d’un côté, plus 400% de l’autre!” (40% less on the one hand,
400% more on the other), La Liberté (Fribourg, Switzerland), 2 December 2009, p. 8.
23. Christian de Perthuis and Anaïs Delbosc, “Négociations climatiques: les enjeux du post-Copenhague ”
(Climate negotiations: post-Copenhagen challenges), L’Économie politique, no. 46, 2010, p. 74. IPCC is
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change formed in 1988 at the initiative of the World Mete-
orological Organisation and the United Nations. At regular intervals, it puts out a summary of recent
scientific work on both ongoing and foreseeable climate change.
In the same vein, Nicholas Stern (24) said in June 2010 that the Copen-
hagen Conference was in many ways disappointing, but that it could have
been much worse and that it did provide a basis for discussion towards an
international treaty.
A year after this summit, which had inspired the most feverish excite-
ment, the one in Cancun (COP 16) opened with quasi-indifferent media
coverage. Of course the basic geopolitical reality had not changed. At a
press conference on 22 November in Washington, Todd Stern, the US Spe-
cial Envoy for Climate Change, said a treaty including quantified reduction
commitments for Western countries should also apply to emerging ones
such as China. (25) Two days later, Xie Zhenhua, deputy head of the National
Development and Reform Commission, retorted, “Developed countries
have to take the lead in reducing their carbon missions and making space
for developing nations to prosper.” He stressed that China will not accept
any obligation beyond its ability as a developing country. (26)
The 194 countries that met in Mexico had to confront (at least) four
challenges: save the Kyoto Protocol, conserve tropical forests, get a “Green
Fund” going, and set up a monitoring mechanism to measure progress. At
the outset Japan upped the stakes; vice-minister for environment Hideki
Minamikawa said he was opposed to a second period of commitment to
the Kyoto Protocol (the first ending in 2012), arguing that signatory coun-
tries accounted for just 27 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.
After 12 days of debate an agreement finally resulted.
A modest accord, (27) of course, but it nevertheless restored (a little) of
the UN’s credibility, and broke the cycle of failure Copenhagen seemed to
have set off. Two advances are particularly noteworthy: the creation of a
Green Fund and an extension of the Kyoto Protocol. The Green Fund is
aimed at helping developing countries adapt to climate change, protect
tropical forests, and switch to green technologies such as solar and wind.
The Fund, under temporary World Bank control, is expected to command
$100 billion annually starting in… 2020. But the issue of intellectual
property rights linked to technology transfers has been evaded. The Kyoto
Protocol – the only legally binding international text on climate to date
(but which binds neither the United States nor China to any emission
cuts) – was extended by a year. The parties postponed until 2011 the ne-
gotiations on its future, or rather to ensure that there was no delay be-
tween the first and second commitment periods … should there be a sec-
ond one. In addition, the text reaffirms that industrialised countries would
have to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 25 percent to 40 per-
cent by 2030. And emerging giants such as China and India would commit
to submitting, once every two years, reports on their emissions and on
the measures taken to reduce them. These, the text hastened to add,
would be subject to international consultations and analysis that were
“non intrusive,” “non punitive,” and “respecting national sovereignty”…
No comment…
As Christiana Figueres, the UN climate chief said, “it is not the end, it is
just the beginning.” (28) But the beginning of what? What can be expected
from COP 17, which convenes in late 2011 at Durban? What is there to be
optimistic about … when there is so much reason not to be?
The ruse of reason and the invisible hand to
climate’s rescue?
Progress sometimes takes strange turns. Although Sino-US cooperation
in reversing climate change is not on the agenda, two factors give cause
for optimism: rivalry in the matter of green technologies, and the air pol-
lution problems currently vexing the Chinese.
President Obama’s speech on 24 February 2009 to the two houses of
Congress gives a good inkling of the tone:
We know the country that harnesses the power of clean, renewable
energy will lead the 21st century.  And yet, it is China that has
launched the largest effort in history to make their economy energy
efficient. […] But to truly transform our economy, protect our secu-
rity, and save our planet from the ravages of climate change, we
need to ultimately make clean, renewable energy the profitable kind
of energy. (29)
A priori, however, the United States is well placed to face this challenge.
In 2009, it was the world leader in the Innovation Index, while China did
not figure among the top 24. (30) In terms of research and development
spending, it is well ahead of China by any yardstick (total expenditure of
percentage of GDP – Table 5). The same goes for patents: for 2005-2007,
the United States had 81,329 (second behind Japan, which had 127,644)
against 25,909 for China (fifth).
However, analyses of these figures tend towards nuancing, though not
discounting, what they may suggest at first glance.
Table 5 is a case in point. Between 2006 and 2007, spending on research
and development rose by 7.3 percent in the United States, against 29 per-
cent in China. Although the base amount is almost 10 times higher in the
United States than in China, the percentage comparison remains signifi-
cant. According to China’s State Intellectual Property Office, 580,000
patents were filed in 2009, or 41 percent more than the previous year and
five times that in 2001. Further, a growing proportion of these are “inven-
tion patents” (not merely improvements on existing inventions) and are
held by Chinese companies. China also holds an increasing number of
patents abroad. In 1999, for example, 90 Chinese patents were granted in
the United States; in 2008, this rose to 1,225. (31) UNESCO’s 2010 Science
Report considers it almost certain that China will henceforth be the coun-
try with the largest number of researchers: There were 1.59 million in
2008. To grasp the magnitude of the progress: China had 1.423 million re-
searchers in 2007 and… 695,000 in 2000 – a 229 percent increase in eight
years. (32) Between 2000 and 2008, the value of China’s high technology ex-
ports to the United States rose from $28 billion to $112 billion. (33)
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This is reflected in the area of “green” technologies as well. China has
become the world’s top producer of low energy light bulbs, wind tur-
bines, solar panels, solar water heaters (60 percent of the global market),
batteries for electric cars, and so on. (34) According to a 2010 World Bank
report, (35) China is fast developing technological innovations in renew-
able energy, representing 0.7 percent of its patents between 2003 and
2005 against 0.3 percent for the United States. Some experts say China
will soon overtake older industrial countries in drawing up norms for en-
vironmental products. In short, China aims to prevail in future markets,
especially those for “clean” products, in which the Westerners have ceded
incontestable leadership. According to the Washington-based Pew Envi-
ronment Group Climate and Energy Program, China in 2009 invested $34
billion in clean technologies, whereas the United States devoted just
$18.6 billion. (36) As Todd Stern said at the press conference mentioned
earlier: 
(I)ntensive effort to work on the electrification of the vehicle fleet
and the production of electric cars in the United states (…) could
be a very good thing for our auto business, for creating jobs, for
manufacturing in Ohio and Michigan, for example (…) So I think
that there are things that will be doable even with people who are
– who do not profess belief in what science is obviously telling us
all.
But Sino-US competition is also raging in more traditional energy tech-
nologies. Thus, according to the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs (Harvard University), Chinese and US investment in energy-related
R&D in 2008 was $11.8 billion and $4.1 billion respectively (Table 6).
Unintended consequences of commercial rivalry could thus be positive
for the “greening” of economic growth. Added to this is China’s evident in-
terest in combating air pollution, which has become a nationwide prob-
lem.
China confronts ecological problems of gigantic proportions that show
up at all levels and touch all sectors. A report of the World Bank and SEPA
(State Environmental Protection Administration) in 2007, which was cut
and censored at the Chinese government’s request, estimated that pollu-
tion causes 750,000 deaths in China each year. A government report in
2007 put out by the official Xinhua News Agency put China in 100th place
out of 118 developed and developing nations classed according to an eco-
logical modernisation indicator. (37) In 2006, Yale University’s environmental
performance index ranked China 94th out of 133 countries. (38)
These problems mainly hit the most vulnerable, reinforcing social in-
equality and exacerbating popular discontent. Thus, according to the Chi-
nese Academy of Social Sciences, incidents of social unrest rose from
40,000 in 2001 to more than 90,000 in 2009. The Academy has noted that
incidents have increased in scope. (39) It is estimated that some 51,000 in-
cidents were linked to pollution in 2005 (40) – an impressive statistic, and it
should be noted that air pollution alone (which concerns us here) causes
at least 350,000 deaths annually. (41)
This explains “increasing” moves that could translate environmental con-
cerns into solutions that would help limit emissions of greenhouse
gases. (42) In general, it should usher in measures linking the aims dear to
the leaders of emerging countries (economic growth, security, air quality…
) with the fight against climate change.
Examples abound. To illustrate, it might be pointed out that reducing
emissions of “black carbon” or ozone would rapidly improve living condi-
tions for millions of Chinese. (43) “Black carbon” stands for carbon particles
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Country Country
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 ∆%
7 7 US 2.61 2.67 1 1 US 343.7 368.8 7.3%
23 23 China 1.36 1.49 6 5 China 37.7 48.8 29%
Table 5 – Total R&D expenditure (2006 and 2007)
World ranking As % of GDP World ranking Amount (In billions of dollars)
Source: The Economist, Pocket World in Figures. 2010 Edition, London, Profile Books, 2009, p. 63 and The Economist, Pocket World in Figures. 2011 Edition, London, Profile Books, 2010, 63.
In million 2008
PPP $Int 
Fossil 
(incl. Carbon 
capture 
and storage)
Nuclear 
(incl. fusion)
Electricity 
transmission, 
distribution 
and storage
Renewable 
energy 
sources
Energy 
efficiency
Energy 
technologies 
(not specified) Total
China 6,755 12 NA* NA 136 4,900 11,803
United States 659 770 319 699 525 1 160 4,132
Table 6 – Available information on R&D investment in the field of energy
* Data not available.
Source: Ruud Kempener, “Energy innovation policy in major emerging countries,” text available on the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs website: (http://www.belfercenter.org/).
that lend smoke its black or brown colour. Its warming effect is between
20 percent and 50 percent of CO2 (an invisible gas). (44) As for ozone (45)
(formed through combination of “precursor” gases such as carbon monox-
ide and methane), its warming potential is about 20 percent that of CO2.
As these two types of emissions have localised consequences – that is,
their effects can be felt locally – a government would be inclined to limit
their volume. In fact, reducing emissions of ozone precursors would have
positive impact on food production, reduce black carbon release, and ben-
efit people’s health without affecting their lifestyle.
Beijing seems to realise the importance of these challenges, the more so
as the economy’s energy demand is likely to keep growing in the coming
decades. The IEA’s prognosis is that China’s CO2 emissions will nearly dou-
ble by 2030. Striking though this might appear, this figure is based on the
hypothesis of a rate of annual growth of these emissions being of the order
of only 2.9 percent, whereas it was actually 16 percent in 2003, 19 percent
in 2004, 11 percent in 2005 and 2006, and 8 percent in 2007 and 2008. In
2008, power and heat production represented 48 percent of total emis-
sions, against 7 percent for transport, for instance. In fact, as the IEA has
said, electricity demand has been and will be the main factor behind grow-
ing CO2 emissions to the extent that about four-fifths of its production is
by thermal plants. (46) In 2009, China’s electricity production capacity rose
by 81 gigawatts, a little over the total capacity of South Korea. (47) It is
therefore understandable that the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010) envis-
aged reducing energy intensity by 20 percent, and that a major focus of
the 12th Plan (2011-2015) is not only to pursue efforts towards reducing
emissions of pollutants and conserving energy but also to reorient China’s
economy towards a green development model and lower carbon intensity.
It was also with the aim of reducing dependence on polluting resources
that China decided to build 28 nuclear reactors by 2020, a program more
or less confirmed after the Japanese nuclear disaster of March 2011. In the
administrative domain, there has been the transformation of SEPA into the
Ministry of Environment Protection in 2008. 
Further, leading academics and government representatives have taken
highly encouraging stands. Among them is Hu Angang, one of China’s best-
known economists. The Tsinghua University professor proposed in an arti-
cle in 2009 (before the Copenhagen Conference) (48) that each country’s
emission reduction obligations should be assessed in relation to its devel-
opment level, its emissions per capita, and its total emissions. China would
then have to “accept its responsibilities,” he said. “The authorities at pres-
ent haven’t realised this and have clearly not taken facts into considera-
tion.”
He is far from being alone. In fact, a wide-ranging debate took place in
China in 2009 on the possible adoption of a carbon tax. (49) Many admin-
istrations and scholars voiced support for the move. Some defend this
stand, a little like Hu, by stressing the fact that the adoption of such a
measure would boost China’s credibility on the international scene. Oth-
ers, more focused on the near term, see in it a means of countering the
threat held out by some Western countries of introducing a carbon tax at
the border. This arguably shows that international pressures can (some-
times) have positive effects. It is regrettable in this context that there was
no follow-up to Joseph Stiglitz’s proposal of a few years ago to levy a tax
on US imports of products made by enterprises emitting greenhouses
gases. This winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize for Economics argued that such
a tax would counter the competition distortion benefiting countries that
were not parties to the Kyoto Protocol. (50)
However, as for the G2, nothing has changed. All indications are that the
Chinese middle class will keep growing – and this can hardly be deplored
– and that pressure on the environment will increase. An OECD working
document published in January 2010 predicts that by 2030, five billion
people will belong to the middle class (defined as households with daily
expenses of between $10 and $100 in PPP). Homi Kharas (author of the
OECD text) and Geoffrey Gertz, in a book published the same year, envis-
age a Chinese middle class of 670 million people against some150 million
today. (51) Besides, climate negotiations are just one among many themes
in the Sino-US rivalry. It was perhaps not unintended that in the weeks fol-
lowing the Copenhagen summit, President Obama received the Dalai Lama
at the White House and authorised more than $6 billion worth of arms
sales to Taiwan.
Conclusion
Evidently, climate is now hostage to the G2. As Chris Patten says, “China
will not move without America, and America will not move without China.
They are locked together. An agreement between them is vital to saving
the century.” (52)
Given this “confidence building” problem, the best that can be hoped for
in the coming years would be for climate conferences to lead to a cycle of
negotiations, as in the case of disarmament – the technicalities of which
they have borrowed – or trade talks, the slow pace of which they share.
One peculiarity of climate negotiations is that they never pick up where
they left off. The longer the delay, the further the ecological situation de-
teriorates and the more difficult (and costly) it becomes. At the same time,
the need for remedy becomes more urgent. Further, global warming could
contribute to provoking or exacerbating conflicts or giving rise to new in-
ternational rivalries. The case of melting ice on the North Pole perfectly il-
lustrates the state of affairs. The Arctic had been a zone of cooperation, but
once it became possible to steer ships there and exploit energy and min-
eral resources at short notice, it became a bone of contention. It is thus no
exaggeration to say that whatever may be said about human activity’s role
in climate change, “decarbonisation” of the economy would be a highly de-
sirable aim simply from a security angle. •
  Translated by N. Jayaram
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